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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of vertically interrelated markets of identical ﬁxed size
under implementation of positive indirect network eﬀects. By introducing two Salop
circles, a two-sided market model is provided, where intermediaries of diﬀerentiated
copyrights for intellectual property, like performing rights organizations or publishers,
compete as oligopsonists for owners of the intellectual property and as oligopolists for
the users of their blanket licenses. We demonstrate, that an increase in competition
beneﬁts either license users or copyright owners or harms both groups. Moreover,
if license users gain from an increased market entry, the owners of the intellectual
property have to incur losses and vice versa.
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Intellectual property can be described as any valuable human product that has an existence
separable from a unique physical embodiment (Landes and Posner (2003)). This notion
indicates a marketability of copyrights and encloses verbal or musical expressive work. In
the case of music as the intellectual property, composers, songwriters or artists are copy-
right owners which have to be compensated if their work is used for commercial purposes.
Hence, when a copyrighted song is played on the radio or on television, the copyright owner
of the song is entitled to receive a compensation. In order to reduce transaction costs and
to increase eﬃciency, performing rights organizations (PROs) hold in trust composers’
copyrights by oﬀering blanket licenses 1. Thus, PROs can be established as intermediaries
which allow for an eﬃcient economic exchange of claims between copyright owners and
the users of licenses, because it would indeed be very diﬃcult and costly for the copyright
owners to monitor all radio and TV stations and to determine whether their songs are
being played or not: but also potential users of copyrights would have to face high search
costs to identify the respective copyright owner of the music, they intend to broadcast.
The role of PROs became more important in recent years. Digitalization and ﬁle shar-
ing transformed music into an informational good, which is in most cases characterized
by non-excludability. Thus, digitalized music can actually be classiﬁed as a public good.
Most music labels incurred severe losses caused by the widely-used peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing
technology2, while it seems that PROs beneﬁted from this development 3. Those major
changes in the technology and business of music distribution as well as changes in the
legal framework constitute a major challenge to the business model of performance rights
1 Compare Merges (2008) for a broader discussion of the transaction cost problem.
2 An empirical analysis concerning decreasing returns of the music industry and ﬁle sharing is provided
by Rob and Waldfogel (2006). There exists a wide range of literature dealing with illegal distribution
of music (see e.g. Gayer and Shy (2005) or Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006), who establish that free
downloading can also cause positive eﬀects for the business of live performances as well as it can improve
the match between the customers’ tastes and the characteristics of the music.)
3 see for example Merges (2008) or The BMI Annual Review 2008 - 2009: BMI raised its royalty payments
from almost 500 million Dollar in the year 2003 to 903 million Dollar in its 2009 ﬁscal year.
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It is often argued, that the collective administration of copyright laws is the most eﬃcient
way to license and to enforce the copyrights of owners of protected intellectual property.
Due to the existence of ﬁxed costs in the administration of copyrights, a single adminis-
trator beneﬁts from economies of scale. This ’natural monopoly argument’ is often cited
in the discussion about regulation or fostering competition between performing rights or-
ganizations (see e.g. Katz (2005)). Following this argument, it is not surprising that the
situation in Europe is characterized by national, factual and legal monopolistic organiza-
tions like the German GEMA. Without regulation or fostering competition, the existence
of such monopolies could be socially problematic, because no price competition between
the copyright owners exist, allowing PROs to exploit their market power to the disadvan-
tage of users of performing rights. Consider for example that a respective online business
model like a video platform needs a certain selection of popular music to retain listeners
and therefore to generate revenues from advertising. At compiling these selection, the user
of the music is dependent on the pricing policy of a monopolistic organization. Further-
more, PROs can abuse their authority by imposing burdensome conditions for their own
members and by discriminating between their members implying disadvantages for com-
posers. Recent eﬀorts made by the European Commission4 in order to foster competition
between the PROs in the European domestic market indicates that national licensing can
be considered a severe impediment to the business of digital music platforms. Abolishing
the barriers of jurisdictional licensing should foster competition between the PROs in a
single European market.
In contrast to the European market, the American market for performance rights licensing
is characterized by oligopolistic competition. Until 1939 the ASCAP (American Society
for of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) has been the ﬁrst and single performing rights
organization, founded as a ﬁrst eﬀort to collect fees for the public performance of music.
4 see Reference of the Commission. Number 2005/737/EG. Further examples of competition law enforce-
ments against PROs in several countries can be found in Katz (2005).
2
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 056In the beginning popularity of radio broadcasting, ASCAP used its monopolistic market
power to rise the rate for their blanket licenses from 2 percent up to 7.5 percent of the
broadcasters’ gross revenues (see e.g. Kleit (2000) as well as Conolly and Krueger (2005)).
Due to this fact, broadcasters decided to start their own organization in order to foster
competition and to break ASCAP’s monopolistic tactics. In 1939, the National Associ-
ation of broadcasters, in cooperation with NBC and CBS, founded its own PRO called
BMI (Broadcast Music Incorporated). Today, ASCAP and BMI 5 are not-for-proﬁt en-
tities sharing the US market in an almost perfect duopolistic competition. With SESAC
(Society of European Stage Authors & composers), a third private player operates in the
market with a small market share of only 3 - 5 percent. But SESAC, in contrast to ASCAP
and BMI is a for-proﬁt company that is not owned by publishers and musicians allowing
to adopt a more exclusive policy6 (see e.g. Conolly and Krueger (2005)). Today, 201 PROs
operate in 108 countries organized under the ’International Confederation of Societies of
Authors and Composers’.
Following the inspiring ideas presented by Kleit (2000) and Katz (2005), we investigate
a Bertrand type stylized model under implementation of two Salop-circles of ﬁxed size,
in which institutions like PROs or music publishers acting as intermediaries between the
owners of copyrights (composers or artists) and the users (radio or TV stations). We
introduce the idea that these intermediaries specialize in particular type of music7. Inter-
mediaries compete in the acquisition and in the supply of a diﬀerentiated product for the
5 Kleit (2001) describes the investments in BMI as a ’pure public good’ because it was prohibited to BMI
to exclude or discriminate any non-members as well as to implement exclusionary contractual strategies.
6 Due to Katz (2005) the existence of SESAC could be seen as an interesting fact against the natural
monopoly argument. The small market share of SESAC indicates a monopolistic market structure is
not needed to license eﬃciently. Kleit (2000) argues that a model would be of interest where PROs like
SESAC can aggressively market on one part of the product space without facing antitrust constraints
like ASCAP and BMI.
7 Kohn and Kohn (2002) argue, that it was once believed that a composer’s decision to join a PRO
depended to a large degree on the type of music. For example, composers of indie music was better oﬀ
with BMI. Although Kohn and Kohn (2002) state that these distinctions do not exist anymore, we pick
it up as inspiration for a possible setup keeping aloof from monopolistic licensing.
3
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This paper contributes to the existing literature providing a formal economic analysis
of performance rights licensing. In a simple theoretical framework, Besen et al. (1992)
modeled PROs as copyright collectives. They showed that with open entry collective
membership grows until the costs of the collective and its members equals the value of
the entire repertoire of the organization. Kleit (2000) examined competition between per-
formance rights organizations which oﬀer blanket licenses on a Salop circle. The model
assumes only one demander moving on the circular market where musicians place their
songs equidistantly in a diﬀerentiated product space. Kleit (2000) also demonstrated that
in a competitive duopoly blanket licenses prevail, instead of per-use licenses. In contrast to
Kleit’s work, we solely consider blanket licenses and assume that intermediaries specialize
on certain parts of the music product space.
The paper contributes to the existing literature on competition in two-sided markets9.
The characteristic of such a scenario is that participants on one of the market can directly
proﬁt from an increasing number of participants on the other side of the market and vice
versa. Both groups of participants are typically intermediated by platforms which compete
for customers on both sides.
The model provided in this paper can be described as a vertically integrated market, where
musicians and composers ﬁrst oﬀer an input in the form of the copyright of their music,
PROs collect these inputs and bundle them to a blanket license which they oﬀer on an
output market. Some recent papers contributed to the research of considering interrelated
markets in a framework of spatial competition. Alexandrov et al. (2008) develop a ver-
tically related market model of spatial Bertrand competition with two circular markets,
where intermediaries compete for suppliers on an input market and for customers on an
output market. In contrast to our work, the paper focuses only on situations where either
8 Note that music can not only be diﬀerentiated by genre but also by the degree of popularity.
9 The notion two-sided markets was introduced by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and applied to several
industries like advertising on media platforms (see e.g. Armstrong (2006)).
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By varying the circumference of the respective circular market, they create a framework
where intermediaries are either monopsonists or oligopsonists on the input market and
always local monopolists on the output market.
Reisinger and Schnitzer (2009) construct a model of vertical relation considering oligopolis-
tic competition on an upstream and a downstream market by using two interrelated circu-
lar markets. By implementing a successive approach, upstream ﬁrms must set their prices
under uncertainty of the demand of the downstream ﬁrms. In this framework downstream
conditions dominate the standard Salop model and regulation of the downstream market
is welfare enhancing if the number of upstream and downstream ﬁrms is relatively small.
The present paper is primarily related to the work of Dewenter et al. (2009) who in-
vestigated a horizontal interrelation between a market for music recordings and concert
tickets. By introducing indirect network eﬀects they showed that prices in both markets
are corrected downwards compared to the standard Salop model and that ﬁle sharing can
have ambiguous eﬀects on the particular parameter values. The following section sets out
the model.
2 Model Setup
The following model introduces intermediaries of copyrights, for example in the form of
PROs or music publishers, which allows for an economic eﬃcient intermediation between
owners and users of copyrighted work by considering positive indirect network eﬀects and
a diﬀerentiated measure of preferences for the respective copyrighted work (e.g. musical
genre or the degree of musical mainstream appeal).
A discrete number of copyright owners like artists and composers and license customers
like radio stations is uniformly distributed on two respective Salop-circles with a nor-
malized circumference of one. Both circles are interrelated by the PROs, which act as
intermediaries between the two circular cities. This means that the PROs provide the
service of enforcing copyrights of artists and composers and that they compete for these
copyrights as oligopsonists on the ﬁrst circular market. The aﬃliated copyrights are
5
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potential license customers on the second circular market.
The PROs are equidistantly and symmetrically distributed between both circles. Thus,
they are located at the same position on both circles. We assume that the intermediaries
solely sell blanket licenses to the license customers containing their entire repertoire,
which is determined by their market share within the group of artists and composers.
Hence, the segmental market share within the group of license customers of a respective
intermediary PRO exactly corresponds to its segmental market share within the group of











  market share and repertoire 
of the blanket license of PRO1
Figure 1: Two vertically interrelated Salop-circles with N = 4 PROs
We assume copyright owners to receive a monetary beneﬁt by the royalty payments of the
respective PRO which is ﬁnanced by the price charged for the blanket license10. Indirect
network eﬀects play an important role in the licensing of performance rights. Artists or
composers can gain a lot from indirect network eﬀects from being aﬃliated with a PRO.
The intuition behind this scenario is simple. Imagine a radio station which buys a blanket
license containing a song of a respective artist. This radio station can play the song as
10 Note, that copyright owners do not have the outside option of single transactions with potential license
customers as well as the license user does not have another alternative as to buy a blanket license if she
wants to use a copyrighted work.
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gain in popularity. By imputing an interrelation between the frequency of a song being
played on air and record sales, a positive network externality could be introduced 11.
Thus, a copyright owner is interested in being aﬃliated with a PRO which has a large
market share within the group of license users. On the license users’ circular market,
positive indirect network eﬀects play a similarly important role. A respective TV or radio
station gains more utility from a blanket license containing a larger repertoire of musical
diversity. Thus, the existence of indirect positive network eﬀects is directly caused by the
importance of economies of scope in the licensing of performing rights.
As in all models of spatial competition, every copyright owner and license customer faces
so called ’transportation costs’ per unit of distance. These ’transport costs’ are just
a synonym for the degree of preference diﬀerentiation between the respective agents on
both circles and thus for the horizontal diﬀerentiation of the respective product like music.
Remember that a license user is located on a certain position on the circular market. If the
position of this respective user is not conform with the location of the intermediary on the
circle, the customer will not get a license ﬁtting best to his preferences. It follows, that the
customer has to make compromises by moving towards the next PRO. The same situation
is valid for copyright owners. Note, that PROs are mostly copyright collectives which are
often founded by composers. By not completely abolishing the ’copyright collective idea’
one can assume that the raisers of a PRO are located on a certain position, while other
composers have to make compromises, here a decrease in the gross utility amounting to
the transportation costs, to get aﬃliated with the respective PRO12.
The intermediary PROs compete on both markets in a ’one shot game’ by setting their
11 Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) cite a survey according to which the radio is seen as the most important
type of media which inﬂuenced US consumers’ buying decision of their last CD.
12 This could also be a monetary loss caused by ’royalty discrimination’. Many PROs pay diﬀerent royalties
to their members according to their success and thus according to their degree of musical diﬀerentiation.
It is well known that the German GEMA makes a diﬀerence in royalty payments between full members
and other members.
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a model which speciﬁes the oligopolistic competition between the intermediary PROs is
provided.
3 Oligopolistic Competition Between Intermediaries of In-
tellectual Property Rights Licenses
We assume that every right owner oﬀers only one copyrighted song or album, while we
make the restrictive assumption that license users only buy one blanket license that covers
the entire repertoire of an intermediary and that ﬁts best to their preferences (here: their
position on the circular market)14. A discrete number of copyright owners k = 1,...,n
and customers i = 1,...,m are uniformly distributed on their respective circular markets.
The j = 1,...,N intermediary PROs, which interrelate the two markets, are equidistantly
distributed on both circles. Consider a respective PRO j which is located at the identical
position xj and qj somewhere on both circular markets. Assume now a given copyright
owner who is located at position qk on her circular market which is to the right of qj.
Thus, the utility of this copyright owner depends negatively on the distance |qj − qk|,
which means that the copyright owner has to make compromises and to approach PRO
j to get aﬃliated with it. The degree of this disutility is measured by the transportation
cost parameter τ. Equivalently, a given license user at position xi, with xi  = xj, knows
that she has to approach PRO j at a transportation cost parameter t and to buy a blanket
license which does not perfectly coincide with her preferences. Thus, a respective copyright
owner k and license user i receive the following utility from making a deal with PRO j:
Uk = V + wj + θxj − τ |qj − qk|, (1)
13 As Kleit(2000) mentioned, the realistic game in such a framework is more dynamic, rather than occurring
at one time.
14 Following Armstrong (2006), license users are ’single homing’.
8
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 056and
Ui = R + λqj − t|xj − xi| − pj (2)
where R speciﬁes the license customer’s reservation utility of buying her ideal blanket
license which is deﬁned as a license obtained from a PRO which is located at the identical
position on the circle. A given PRO j charges a price pj for its blanket license. Copy-
right owners have a gross utility V of being aﬃliated with an intermediary15 and receive a
positive monetary ﬁxed royalty wj from intermediary j16. Note that a buyer of a blanket
license, for example a radio station, uses the license to attract listeners and thus to gain
in popularity and it is obvious that an increase in popularity makes it easier to generate
higher amounts of advertising revenues. By assuming that an increased variety covered
by the blanket license is more attractive for listeners, an increase of the repertoire of the
blanket license from a respective PRO j, which is determined by the segmental market
share of PRO j within the group of copyright owners qj, enhances the utility of a respective
buyer of this blanket license. The scaling parameter λ measures the beneﬁcial inﬂuence
of qj on Ui. Vice versa, a given copyright owner beneﬁts from an increasing segmental
market share xj of the PRO j within the group of license customers. This increase in
utility is measured by the scaling parameter θ.
As already mentioned, PROs are characterized by equidistant locations on the circular
market in order to niche the market of the diﬀerentiated product music. From the as-
sumption that copyright holders as well as license users are uniformly distributed on their
respective circle, each pair of adjacent PROs (j,j + 1) is observed by an equal share 1/N
of copyright holders and license customers.
The market segment of PRO j within the group of license users xj can be derived by the
standard Salop approach. The license customer who is indiﬀerent between PRO j and
15 The gross utility V is assumed to be large enough to ensure that all copyright owners are aﬃliated with
a PRO.
16 Note that we do not consider any discrimination policies concerning royalties and prices.
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distance of   x to the right of PRO j. By assuming PRO j + 1 to have a market share of
  q within the group of license owners and to ask for a price   p, we can equate the utility
functions of the indiﬀerent license customer   x and thus we have




−   x
 
−   p. (3)
Solving for   x yields the location of the marginal license demander. According to the
symmetric structure of the model,   x also determines the marginal customer on the left
side from j who is indiﬀerent between the blanket license of PRO j−1 and PRO j. Hence,
doubling   x yields the PRO’s market share xj within the group of license customers, which
is just the length of the distance on the circle between the two marginal customers   xj−1
and   xj+1:
xj = 2  x =






To comply with the requirements of oﬀering a blanket license, intermediary j has to pool
the respective copyrights from those copyright owners who can reach a positive utility
from getting aﬃliated with PRO j. Therefore, we have to derive the position   q of the
marginal right owner, who is indiﬀerent between being aﬃliated with intermediary j or
its respective neighboring PRO j +1, which oﬀers royalty   w and serves a market segment
  x within the group of license users. Hence, we have




−   q
 
. (5)
In the same way as deriving the market segment within the group of license customers,
solving for   q determines the position of the marginal copyright owner. Doubling   q let us
derive the variety of copyrighted music qj which an be pooled to a license by PRO j as a
10
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qj = 2  q =






Due to the positive indirect network eﬀects, the market segment qj depends to a degree
of θ on the diﬀerence between PRO j’s own market share and the market share   x of
its adjacent competitors within the group of license customers. Equivalently, the market
share xj within the group of license customers depends to a degree of λ on the diﬀerence
between qj and the market segment   q of the adjacent competitors within the group of
copyright owners.
By considering these interdependencies we want to reformulate (4) and (6) with respect
to prices and royalties. Following Armstrong (2006), we substitute the respective market
segments into each other to derive expressions depending solely on prices and royalties.
The market segments within the group of license customers as well as copyright owners














17. Thus, the reformulated market shares can be presented as
xj(wj,pj) =














17 Note, that the next competitor j+1 of PRO j is located at a distance of
1
N to the right of PRO j. Thus,
j + 1 covers a part of the distance between j and j + 1, which is given by b x
j+1 =
1
N − b xj. According
to the symmetric market structure we know that e x = 2b x
j+1. The adjacent PRO’s market segment e q
within the group of copyright owners can be derived equivalently.
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of PRO j, xj(wj,pj) has to be multiplied with the number of license customers m in the
market and the respective equilibrium price pj. Simultaneously, variable costs which are
given by the royalties wj multiplied with the segmental market share within the group
of copyright owners qj(wj,pj) and the number of owners n in the market have to be
considered. Hence, the proﬁt function is given by
πj = pjm
 
















At least, every intermediary faces a ﬁxed set-up cost F, when it decides to enter the
market. Such costs can also contain losses emerging from bargaining with copyright
owners and potential customers18. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we have to
impose the following restriction on the parameter values that ensures concavity of the
proﬁt function in prices and royalties 19.
Assumption 1. To obtain the equilibrium prices and royalties from the ﬁrst-order
conditions, we have to impose the following restriction:
mntτ > (mλ + nθ)2. (10)
18 Note that negotiation costs became more important in the German market for performance rights
licensing since a reformation of the copyright law forces the German GEMA to negotiate with the
collectives for digital storage media. Before 2008, the charges for PCs or DVD writers were prescribed
by law (see ’Zweites Gesetz zur Regelung des Urheberrechts in der Informationsgesellschaft vom 26.
Oktober 2007, § 13a’. A corresponding elaboration can be found in Hucko (2007)). Similar conclusions
can be drawn from the actually failed negotiations between the GEMA and the online video platform
Youtube.
19 Similar restrictions were implemented by Armstrong (2006) and Dewenter et al. (2009).
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The optimal price pj set by intermediary j in equilibrium and the corresponding royalty




























A price pj∗ and a royalty wj∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all j ∈ N, πj(pj∗,   p,wj∗,   w) ≥
πj(∀pj,   p,∀wj,   w), meaning that PRO j chooses its best price and royalty, given that all
other competitors hold their prices and royalties constant. According to the equidistant
locations of the PROs on both circular markets, all competitors are assumed to charge
identical prices and pay identical royalties. Solving (11) and (12) for the symmetric Nash



































From equation (7) and (8), it apparently follows that the symmetric Nash equilibrium
market segments qj∗ and xj∗ are given by 1
N. Thus, the marginal copyright owners as well
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its respective neighbors.
4 Market Entry
In this section we investigate the market entry under a symmetric zero-proﬁt Nash equi-
librium. Thus, intermediaries enter the market until their proﬁt equals their ﬁxed set-up
costs F.
Before investigating market entry conditions, we can rewrite the equilibrium royalty w∗










From (15), it follows that with increasing transportation costs for users, the price p∗, an in-
termediary can impose in equilibrium, increases. By contrast, an increasing transportation
cost parameter τ let the royalty w∗ an intermediary oﬀers in equilibrium, decrease. These
countervailing eﬀects can be explained by the fact that a higher degree of transportation
costs makes it more cost-intensive to switch to one of the intermediary’s neighbors. Thus,
the willingness to pay of a potential demander for a blanket license is higher, while the
PRO can pay less to the copyright owners without being worried about their switching to
one of its neighbors. The inﬂuence of an increasing network eﬀect works in a similar way.
An increasing number of customers m as well as an increasing inﬂuence λ of the blanket
license’s segmental size qj on their utility, increases the equilibrium royalty. Of course, the
more important qj is for license customers, the higher must be w∗ in order to aﬃliate with
more copyright owners, which makes it more attractive for license users to buy a license
14
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combined with an increasing network parameter θ lowers the price, a respective PRO can
impose for its blanket license. These results are due to the aggressive competition between
the intermediary PROs in the present framework. Every PRO oﬀers the highest possible
royalty and the lowest possible price to aﬃliate with as many customers and owners as
possible, driving its proﬁts to zero.
Note that we have to consider a business stealing eﬀect caused by the ﬁxed market sizes.
Thus, a potential new market entrant has to steel a part of the business from the incum-
bent PROs in order to niche the circular music market20.
The countervailing eﬀects of the transportation costs and the network eﬀects make it in-
evitable to impose additional restrictions on the parameter values.
First, in order to ensure positive royalties, we have to impose an additional restrictive
assumption on the parameter values τ and λ 21. From (16) we can derive that 2mλ must
exceed nτ. By considering this restriction, a higher degree of competition lets the roy-
alties decrease 22. Of course, the eﬀect of a variation of the number of market entrants
on the equilibrium price is identical. It follows from (15), that tm > 2nθ is needed to





strictly negative. These results are intuitive. A higher degree of competition for license
users forces the PROs to cut prices for their blanket licenses. From (14), decreasing prices
restrict them to pay higher royalties in the competition for copyright holders.
We observe that our model requires certain restrictive boundaries concerning the relation
between users and owners m
n and the respective transportation cost and network param-
20 As Spence (1976) already stated, a new market entrant causes the pie to be sliced in more pieces. But
in the case at hand, the pie does not expand. A model with a ﬂexible size of the interrelated circular
markets can lead to monopolistic competition on one side of the market. Such a model is provided by
Alexandrov et al. (2008).
21 Note, that we do not consider ’negative royalties’, which could be possible if the gain in utility for the
license holders caused by an the network eﬀects is of such importance that they are willing to pay to
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Hence, the smaller the inﬂuence of the PROs’ market segment within the group of copyright
owners, measured by λ, on the utility of the license users compared with the transportation
costs of the copyright owners τ, the higher must be the user-to-owner relation m
n . This
result is also intuitive. Note that if the positive inﬂuence of the PROs’ market segment
within the copyright owners on the users’ utility is relatively low. It is obvious that the
users’ willingness to pay for a blanket license also tends to be smaller. It follows, that the
number of users compared to the number of owners within the PROs’ bilateral market
segment must be relatively large, to let the PROs pay a positive royalty considering a
given transportation cost parameter τ. The associated welfare implications concerning
the restrictions of the relation m
n are presented in the section thereafter.
By inserting the equilibrium prices and royalties from equation (15) and (16) as well as
the symmetric Nash equilibrium market segments 1

















Given our assumptions concerning the parameter values, it can be shown that (17) strictly
decreases with N. In the symmetric zero-proﬁt Nash equilibrium, market entry is endoge-
nously determined. Intermediaries enter the market until their proﬁts vanish. Solving
the proﬁt function π∗ = 0 for N yields the endogenously determined variety of market
entrants NC with free entry:
NC =
 




We observe that a higher degree of preference diﬀerentiation t and τ increases the di-
versity of intermediaries, while stronger complementary eﬀects λ and θ reduce mar-











m(t−2λ)+n(τ−2θ). Increasing ﬁxed set-up
16
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 056costs F cause an increase in equilibrium prices as well as an increase in equilibrium royal-
ties. Thus, increasing ﬁxed set-up costs lower market entrance in equilibrium (∂NC
∂F < 0),
as is always the case in Salop models with free entry.
These results are comparable to the model with horizontally related markets by Dewen-
ter et al. (2009). By contrast, and due to vertically related markets, royalties can be
understood as intermediary PROs variable costs, which increase with a higher degree of
the inﬂuence of the repertoire of the blanket license for customers and decrease with an
increasing preference diﬀerentiation of copyright owners.
5 Welfare Aspects
Within this framework welfare consists of three parts: the surplus of the copyright owners,
the surplus of the license customers and ﬁnally the aggregate surplus of the intermediaries.
Consider now a benevolent social planner who regulates the number of market entrants
under the assumption of a fully covered market23. This section should investigate
the implications of an increase of competition between intermediaries for the aggre-
gate surplus of the copyright owners as well as for the aggregate surplus of the license users.
Proposition 1: Whether the aggregated owner and user surplus increases or decreases
with a higher market penetration of PROs depends on the relation between the proportion
of m to n and the proportion of the two network parameters θ and λ. The aggregated user
surplus increases with an increasing number of market entrants if m
n < θ
2λ and decreases
with a higher N if m
n > θ
2λ. An increase or a decrease in the aggregated owner surplus





23 We assume this planner only to have the ability to impose barriers to potential new market entrants by
e.g. charging an additional ’market-entry tax’. Recent papers (see Aghion and Schankerman (2004) or
Reisinger and Schnitzer (2009)) investigated a social planner who can positively stimulate the welfare
by a reduction in the transportation cost parameter.
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which can be transformed to
OS = nV +
4(2mλ + nθ) − 5nτ
4N
. (20)
As already mentioned, a higher degree of λ let the royalties increase, while an increasing
θ enhances the copyright owners’ utility of being aﬃliated with an intermediary. And of
course, increasing transportation costs τ lower the aggregated owners’ surplus 24. From
(20) it follows that an increase in N let OS increase if m
n <
(5τ−4θ)
8λ . From (15) we know
that PROs are restricted to oﬀer positive royalties, therefore the relation m
n > τ
2λ must
hold and we have that 10mλ must be larger than 5nτ. By considering this restriction,
it can be shown that (20) increases with an increasing N if 4nθ < 2mλ and therefore if
m
n > 2θ




and thus if m
n < 2θ
λ .























which can be reformulated as
24 Note, as is in the standard Salop model, owners and users travel an average distance of 1/4N on their
respective circular market at corresponding transportation costs τ and t.
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4(mλ + 2nθ) − 5mt
4N
. (22)
We already proved that an increase in competition lowers the price for blanket licenses,
resulting in a positive eﬀect on the license users’ aggregate surplus. Furthermore, an
increasing variety of market entrants lowers the license users’ average transportation
costs. Equivalently to the circular market of the copyright owners, we have to consider
the positive indirect network eﬀects and, of course, a lower market share caused by the
business stealing eﬀect under ﬁxed market size of increasing competition has a negative
inﬂuence on the license users’ utility25.
From (22) it is obvious that US increases with an increase in N if m
n > 8θ
5t−4λ. From
the price equation (15) we know that the equilibrium prices for blanket licenses must be
positive. This is ensured if the restriction m
n > 2θ
t holds. From this relation it follows
that 5mt must be larger than 10nθ and thus, US increases with a higher number of
N if m
n < θ
2λ. By contrast, US decreases with a higher market penetration of PROs if
m
n < 8θ




Figure 2 distinguishes graphically the regions, in which the aggregated user surplus as
well as the aggregated owner surplus increase or decrease with an increasing competition




∂N < 0 or ∂US




∂N > 0 or ∂OS
∂N < 0.
In Figure 2 we can diﬀerentiate between three regions, which are indicated with A,
B and C. Region A is characterized by a small ratio θ
λ. Thus, the positive network
25 Note, that we assume linearity of the network eﬀect as it is assumed in the majority of the literature.
Pollock (2009) showed that in a general non-linear case, welfare eﬀects of a change in network sizes
crucially depends on the degree of diminishing returns in the network eﬀects function.
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utility function of the copyright owners is relatively small compared to the inﬂuence of
this PRO’s segmental market share within the group of copyright owners on the utility
of the license users. Furthermore, a larger relation m
n can be observed in region A. By
considering the foregone discussion, copyright owners must face relatively high aggregate
transportation costs. It follows, that as long as the transportation cost parameters fulﬁll
assumption 1, copyright owners can beneﬁt from an increase in competition while license
users face a utility loss. Thus, a potential social planner would have to decide if she












Figure 2: Aggregated customer and owner surplus with respect to m
n and θ
λ.
Consider now an increase in θ
λ and/or a small decrease in m




2λ. In region B we can observe that the ratio m
n as well as the ratio
θ
λ are more balanced. Under this scenario, indirect network eﬀects play a more important
role for users as well as for owners and an increase in the number of market entrants N
lowers the aggregate surplus of both groups. Of course, a monopolistic market structure
would maximize the welfare of users and owners.
Region C tends to come with a smaller ratio m
n and a larger ratio θ
λ. The variety of
copyright owners in the market is relatively large as well as the positive indirect network
eﬀect of the PROs’ segmental market shares within the group of copyright owners is
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costs exceed the beneﬁts from the indirect network eﬀects26 and if assumption 1 is fulﬁlled,
license users can gain from an increase in competition. Again, as is in region A, fostering
competition enhances only the aggregated surplus of one side of the market while the
other side incurs losses. But in contrast to region A, stimulating competition enhances
the users’ welfare while copyright owners have to face losses.
We see, that within this framework an increase in competition never generates coexistent
beneﬁts for users and owners. Moreover, if m
n ∈ [ θ
2λ, 2θ
λ ] it follows, that an increased
market entry always lowers the aggregated customer surplus as well as the aggregated
owner surplus and thus, a monopolistic market setup is welfare optimal.
6 Aggregate Surplus Optimal Market Entry
To derive the aggregate surplus optimal number of market entrants NW we have to sum
the individual aggregate surplus functions to an overall aggregate surplus function Ω,































































26 We can say that license users rather prefer a good valued license, covering only a particular segment
of the circular market, which perfectly ﬁts to their preference instead of a license which covers a wide
range of music.
27 We have to refer to the doubtful meaning of a cardinally measured aggregate surplus function. But
by considering the parameter restrictions, this let us apply comparative statics to make it possible to
derive results from the model.
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Ω = (mR + nV − FN) +
4(mλ + 2nθ) − mt − nτ
4N
. (24)









It is obvious and conform to the previous discussion, that the aggregate surplus optimal
number of market entrants increases with a higher degree of transportation cost, while
an increasing importance of the network parameters λ and θ lowers the aggregate surplus
optimal number of PROs.
Note, that in this setup of vertically related markets, social welfare is maximized when
the average losses caused by transportation costs 1
4N(mt + nτ) less the extra surplus
from the beneﬁts of the indirect network eﬀects 1
N(nθ + mλ) equals the accumulated
ﬁxed costs NF of all market entrants. From (25) we can see that this is exactly the
case if FN = 1
4N(mt + nτ − 4(nθ + mλ)). By considering the previous discussion, we can
neither determine a robust result whether an increase in competition enhances or lowers the
aggregate overall surplus nor whether the social optimal level of market entry is below the
free-entry equilirium level28. It depends inevitably on the distribution of the preferences
of the copyright owners as well as on those of the customers of a blanket license and
therefore on the calibration of the parameters and of course on the ratio between customers
28 The standard result in the literature without positive network externalities is that without entry re-
straints social excessive entry occurs (see: e. g. Salop (1979)). By contrast, Ghosh and Morita (2007)
showed in a vertically related Cournot model with a homogeneous product that insuﬃcient entry can
occur if the ﬁrms on the upstream market have too much power. Furthermore, Gu and Wenzel (2008)
stated, that insuﬃcient entry can prevail if the demand elasticity excesses a certain threshold.
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appropriate to understand models in which intermediaries compete as oligopsonists on a
market for inputs and as oligopolists on a market for outputs if vertically related market
segments of diﬀerentiated products with identical size are considered.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a model of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic competition between inter-
mediaries of copyrights for intellectual property in vertically integrated two-sided markets
like performing rights organizations. By using two interrelated Salop circles of ﬁxed size,
we introduce positive indirect network eﬀects from the copyright owner market to the
license user market and vice versa.
Intermediaries compete as oligopsonists for copyright owners like composers or artist. The
aﬃliated repertoire of copyrights is pooled into a blanket license. Using these blanket
licenses, intermediaries compete as oligopolists for potential license customers. Based
on the aggressive competition and the symmetric market structure in the resulting Nash
equilibrium, we demonstrated that prices for blanket licenses depend on the number of
copyright owners in the market as well as on the parameter which determines the inten-
sity of the positive indirect network eﬀect for copyright owners. The same applies to the
equilibrium royalties, which need a certain number of customers as well as a certain level
of the parameter which determines the intensity of the positive network externality for the
license users to be positive.
Investigating welfare eﬀects, we derive the result that users of a license and copyright
owners never beneﬁt simultaneously from an increase in competition between the inter-
mediaries. Moreover, if an increase in competition beneﬁts license users, copyright owners
have to incur losses and vice versa. Beyond that, both, users and owners lose from a
liberalization of market entry if the ratio between the number of users and owners as well
as the ratio between the two network parameters are relatively balanced.
As mentioned above, the European Commission is taking initiative to foster competition
between the European performing rights organizations. By assuming the scenario that
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our theoretical model let us suppose that abolishing the monopolistic market structure
always harms either the owners of the intellectual property or the license users. However,
even it is intended to improve the license users’ surplus, the degree of preference diﬀer-
entiation as well as the intensity of the network parameters and the number of market
participants must meet certain criteria. Thus, considering positive indirect network exter-
nalities let us not ﬁnd a robust conclusion whether excessive entry occurs as a consequence
of a liberalization of market entry restraints.
This paper contributes to the existing literature which deals with vertically related two-
sided markets and spatial competition. Although we made some restrictive assumptions
concerning the model, it can be helpful to understand the importance of positive indi-
rect network externalities in such a framework. Moreover, considering positive indirect
externalities in a vertically interrelated oligopoly provides no robust result concerning the
socially optimal entry. This is in contrast with the previous research that, under spatial
oligopolistic competition with ﬁxed set-up costs, the level of market penetration in the
free-entry equilibrium is always excessive. Within this model, a social planner has to
anticipate the distribution of preferences under a given number of copyright owners and
users and then to decide whether to foster competition and to act in one group’s best
interest while the other group incurs losses.
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Quasi-concavity of the proﬁt function in prices and royalties let us derive the optimal
market-sharing equilibrium price   p and royalty   w. Therefore, second order conditions














To insure quasi-concavity, the Hessian must be negative semi-deﬁnite. It follows, that the
ﬁrst principal minor D1 = 2mτ
4λθ−tτ needs to be negative. This is fulﬁlled, if
tτ > 4λθ. (27)
The next principal minor has to alter its algebraic sign. Thus, the second principal minor,













has to be positive. This is
satisﬁed, if
mntτ > (mλ + nθ)2. (28)
Equation (28) can be reformulated to tτ > nθ2
m + mλ2
n + 2θλ. Thus, if nθ2
m + mλ2
n > 2θλ,
(28) is more restrictive than (27) and it is suﬃcient to assume mntτ > (mλ + nθ)2 to
satisfy the second-order conditions ensuring quasi-concavity of the proﬁt function.
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